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Summary 
Using a unique set of data and exploiting a large-scale natural experiment, we estimate the 
effect of real-time usage information on residential electricity consumption in Northern 
Ireland. Starting in April 2002, the utility replaced prepayment meters with “smart” meters 
that allow the consumer to track usage in real-time. We rely on this event, account for the 
endogeneity of price and plan with consumption through a plan selection correction term, 
and find that the provision of information is associated with a decline in electricity 
consumption of up to 20%. We find that the reduction is robust to different specifications, 
selection-bias correction methods and subsamples of the original data. At £15-17 per 
tonne of CO2e (2009£), the smart meter program delivers cost-effective reductions in 
carbon dioxide emissions.  
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
Buildings, especially residential buildings, account for a large share of energy 
consumption and offer a natural target for policies that seek to reduce energy consumption and 
increase energy efficiency. These would help reduce CO2 emissions from (fossil-fuel) power 
generation, reduce dependence on imported fuels and vulnerability to supply shocks, and may 
create jobs (Wei et al., 2010).  
Many observers argue that providing better information and feedback on consumption 
helps improve the energy efficiency of the residential sector—by themselves or when combined 
with other traditional policy tools such as economic incentives, pricing and regulation. Earlier 
evaluations of information-based approaches, however,  relied upon short-lived pilot projects or 
small sets of data (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010), and have been hindered by self-selection 
issues due to the voluntary nature of certain initiatives, such as utility-provided audits (Hartman, 
1988).   
Advanced metering initiatives (AMI, or ―smart‖ meters) can give consumers information 
on consumption by combining frequent automated usage readings with accessible feedback 
displays. AMI have received much recent attention and, at least in the US, generous federal 
funding and incentives for deployment. Despite the scale of support from the government
1 and 
the utility industry, there has been little evaluation of these programs. 
                                                           
1 See, for example, http://www.smartgrid.gov/ to get an idea for recent projects funded by the government. 2 
 
Borrowing from an AMI implementation in Northern Ireland, we provide the first large-
scale evidence of the effect of usage information on residential consumption. We estimate 
household response to the provision of immediate feedback about electricity consumption.    
Northern Ireland is a unique setting for studying residential energy consumption for three 
reasons. First, the retail residential rates are among the highest in the United Kingdom and 
Europe, but, until recently, consumers lacked an alternative provider for electricity, which 
suggests that they may be willing and capable of making behavioral changes to save on their 
energy bills when given an opportunity to do so.
2 
Second, there are a host of plan options for electricity in the Northern Ireland market. 
These include credit accounts, direct debit accounts, and prepayment accounts. The variation in 
attributes across plans allows us to identify the effect of price and changes in other important 
plan features.  
Third, one of these plans (prepayment) recently experienced an exogenous change in 
technology (the keypad) which provides readily available and immediate feedback about usage. 
Moreover, because this plan requires prepayment, it suggests that households on it will be 
monitoring their usage. The switch between the previous meter that served prepayment 
customers, which did not have these capabilities, occurred in April 2002. We interpret this as the 
treatment in a natural experiment and use it to identify how electricity consumption was affected 
among the ―treatment‖ customers. Our ―controls‖ are customers in other plans (which do not use 
AMI meters and do not provide real-time information about usage to the consumer). This is a 
large scale natural experiment, since 14% (over 75,000) of the NIE customer base was on a 
prepayment plan at the time of the switch to the keypad metering technology. 
                                                           
2 Government estimates suggest that about one-third of the households in Northern Ireland are ―fuel poor,‖ with fuel 
poverty being defined when 10% or more of the household income is spent on all household fuel use (DSDNI, 
2006). 3 
 
Economic theory does not provide unambiguous predictions about the effect of 
information on energy consumption, due to countervailing incentives to substitute electricity 
savings for savings on monitoring. Whether or not immediate feedback (i.e., the keypad) about 
usage enables consumers to reduce their electricity demand (through conservation or energy-
efficiency investments) is, therefore, an empirical issue.  
We examine this matter using data from 18 waves of Northern Ireland‘s Continuous 
Household Survey (from 1990 to 2009), which we merge with price and plan information from 
the electricity utility, and weather data. Our dataset is a multi-year cross-section and is comprised 
of over 45,000 usable observations. Despite the single-provider electricity market, prices varied 
over time and across payment plans during our study period.  Since electricity price depends on 
the plan, but plan choice may depend on unobserved household characteristics that influence 
both consumption and plan selection, we implement the Dubin-McFadden (1984) correction in 
our demand equations.  We also account for unobserved heterogeneity using geographic fixed 
effects. We find the keypad results in 15-20% less electricity use than other households, even 
controlling for housing type, heating, household characteristics and selection into the plan.  
The keypad may provide a cost-effective alternative to large scale rebate or efficiency 
incentive programs in meeting emission reduction and demand response goals. In terms of CO2 
emissions reduction, we find that the cost-effectiveness of implementing a keypad program—
£15-£17 per tonne of CO2e—is comparable to the current cost of abatement of carbon dioxide 
(buying Certified Emissions Reductions [CERs] on the European exchange).  CERs cost around 
£11 per tonne CO2e, but the UK government uses a policy target price of £25 per tonne CO2e. In 
addition to cost-effective emissions reductions, there may be other benefits associated with 
implementing a program of this type, such as reduced utility service costs. 4 
 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous 
literature. Section 3 describes the utilities of Northern Ireland, prices and plans for the residential 
sector. Section 4 presents a theoretical motivation. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 lays 
out the econometric models and estimation techniques. Section 7 discusses the results. Section 8 
describes a cost-effectiveness calculation. Section 9 concludes.  
 
2. Previous Literature  
Imperfect information and uncertainty about the price of electricity have received much 
attention in the energy economics literature.  Shin (1985) discusses consumers‘ use of the 
average price of electricity (as opposed to the marginal price) when it is difficult to keep track of 
seasonal price changes, block tariffs, fuel surcharges, etc. Metcalf and Rosenthal (1995) study 
the effects of uncertainty about future energy prices on the pattern of energy efficiency 
investments. Ito (2010) summarizes alternative models of consumer behavior in the presence of 
block pricing, showing that people will invest effort in finding out the price of energy only to the 
point in which the gains from re-optimizing consumption decisions exceed the cost of the effort 
spent monitoring and investigating prices.  
In contrast, the literature on consumer response to information about energy usage (as 
opposed to price) is relatively scant. Traditionally, utilities have provided information to a 
customer about his or her energy consumption level (and on how to reduce it) by offering free or 
low-cost audits. Individualized audits, however, are typically utilized by only a small fraction of 
the customer base.  Because audits are voluntary, it is likely that people who reduce energy use 
after an audit would have done so anyway. Hartman (1988) finds that audits do decrease energy 
usage, but that failure to account for self-selection grossly overstates the impact of the audit 5 
 
program. To illustrate, during 1977-1981 (his study period) the average conservation truly 
attributable to the program is 951 kWh/yr—only 39% of the savings calculated based on a naïve 
comparison between participants and non-participants.  
Waldman and Ozog (1996) use a sample of participants and non-participants in a choice-
based sampling framework, and assume that absent any type of incentive, there is a ―natural‖ 
level of conservation, which they identify using the consumers who are not aware of the 
existence of utility incentives (and consequently have zero incentive). They estimate that the 
program truly accounts for only 71% of the total conservation, the remaining 29% being 
―natural‖ conservation (i.e. that would have happened regardless).  
Dulleck and Kaufmann (2004) use monthly time series data for household electricity 
usage in Ireland from 1976 to 1993 and relate them to Demand Side Management policies that 
provided information and offered minor incentives to customers. Their analysis is constrained by 
the fact that they observe only aggregate data, so they estimate a seasonally-adjusted time-series 
model of energy usage. They find that the introduction of information programs reduces long-
term electricity usage by 7%. 
While audits are typically one-off events, recently attention has been focused on ways to 
provide continuous, or at least frequent, feedback to consumers about their energy usage. Darby 
(2006) surveys earlier studies involving the provision of information, both direct (―immediate, 
from the meter or an associated display monitor‖), and indirect (―feedback that has been 
processed in some way before reaching the energy user, normally via billing‖). Reductions in 
consumption are in the 5-15% and 0-10% range, respectively. These are in line with the 
estimates documented in the review by Ehrhardt-Martinez et. al (2010).  6 
 
One way to enhance or manipulate the feedback provided by regular utility bills is to 
augment it with ―social norms‖ contents. In a randomized field experiment involving 80,000 
households in Minnesota, information about the energy usage of neighbors and visual cues about 
doing ―better‖ or ―worse‖ in electricity usage relative to similar neighboring homes has been 
found to reduce energy consumption by 1.9% relative to the baseline (Allcott, 2008). The effect 
decayed over time, perhaps because of the diminishing scope for learning from a neighbor‘s bill 
over time. 
In this paper, we are concerned with the feedback about electricity usage provided by 
devices placed in the consumer‘s home. Matsukawa (2005) estimates the effect of feedback 
information on residential energy usage in Japan. He finds that those residential customers who 
were given access to an informational display explaining how to use appliances more efficiently 
reduced energy usage by 1%, even though the display was not connected with any one appliance 
and no monetary incentives were offered to encourage conservation. 
Recent advanced metering technology—the so-called ―smart meters‖—can be set up to 
allow electricity customers to view how much power is used at any given time. Presumably, this 
usage information assists consumers in adjusting consumption through conservation or by 
investing in energy-efficiency equipment. Advanced metering is an important component of the 
so-called ―smart grid‖ and in 2009 the US federal government awarded over $4 billion to 
projects aimed at modernizing the grid under the ―Stimulus Act.‖
3  
                                                           
3Advanced or ―smart‖ meters allow utilities to communicate wirelessly and in near real-time with customers. This 
allows the utilities to monitor usage remotely, without having to physically read the meter, and it allows customers 
to receive instantaneous updates on their consumption, for example by using an in-home display. As part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, $ 11 billion was allocated to improve the nation‘s electrical grid; the 
Office of Electricity and Energy Reliability received $4.5billion to invest in the smart grid. See 
http://www.smartgrid.gov/ for recent projects funded by the government. 7 
 
To our knowledge, however, only few projects funded by the federal government or the 
utilities have allowed consumers to access information about usage in real time. The majority of 
these projects have been small in scope and duration, or have omitted important variables, 
thwarting efforts to evaluate the impacts of information on electricity consumption.
4 Ideally, one 
would like to observe a relatively large group where the information feedback is varied across 
individuals, and compare results with those from a group with no information treatment.  
What we describe in this paper is one such natural experiment. We take advantage of the 
introduction of an advanced metering device to a group of utility customers in Northern Ireland 
in 2002.  This device replaced a preexisting meter that did not display information. The meters 
and meter replacement affected only customers on a prepayment plan; those on other plans were 
not affected, suggesting that the latter serve as a ―control group.‖ To our knowledge no previous 
research has examined the effect of information provision in an environment where electricity 
price is already salient (prepayment customers), relative to similar consumers who are on regular 
plans.
5  We have a large sample with tens of thousands of households, a wealth of dwelling and 
household characteristics, and we take advantage of the variety of utility plans available in 
Northern Ireland to shed new light on this important question. 
 
3. Background on Utilities and Pricing Schemes in Northern Ireland  
As we explain in detail below, we use data from a large multi-year cross-section survey 
of households in Northern Ireland. Our study period is 1990-2009, and during this time Northern 
Ireland Electricity (NIE) was the electric monopoly for the residential sector in all of Northern 
                                                           
4 ACEEE (2010), for example, classifies a study as a ―large‖ study when there are as few as 100 subjects.  
5 In a paper examining payment behavior of prepayment customers, Brutscher (2011) uses a propensity score 
matching technique to estimate a consumption reduction for NIE keypad customers. However, his approach is 
limited by (i) the omission of price from his demand equation, and (ii) the short time period and small sample from 
which he draws his data. 8 
 
Ireland.  As of September 2010, NIE had approximately 750,000 residential customers with an 
average annual consumption of 4100 kWh.
6, 
7 We use their historical tariff information, from 
1990 to present, to construct our electricity price data and convert bills to kWh used. 
NIE has offered a variety of pricing and payment schemes throughout our study period 
(see tables 1 and 2).
8  The default payment frequency is quarterly, but there are discounts 
available for customers who choose to pay by direct deposit, or who choose a pay-as-you go 
(prepayment) plan. As shown in table 1, from 1990 until 1997 NIE charged its customers a fixed 
fee and a constant tariff per kWh. Starting in April 1997, a two-part tariff was instituted, with a 
fixed fee and decreasing block pricing. The prices were 9.16 pence per kWh in the first block (up 
to 250 kWh per quarter) and 8.16 pence per kWh thereafter. In April 1999, NIE eliminated both 
the block tariff and the fixed fee, and introduced a constant rate per kWh.  
In addition to this variation in the structure of electricity pricing, discounts were and are 
given to customers on various plans, as summarized in table 2. For example, starting in April 
1997, EasySaver and Budget customers received a 1.5% discount, not to exceed £10 per year.
9 
Since April 2002, those customers on NIE‘s direct debit monthly and direct debit quarterly plans 
(―managed‖ plans with even monthly or quarterly payments) have received a 4%  and 2.5% 
discount, respectively, up to a specified maximum annual discount (which was initially £5 and is 
now £40 for the monthly and £25 for the quarterly schemes, respectively).  
                                                           
6 Communication by Gerry Forde of NIE, 7 December 2010. 
7 The Northern Ireland residential market was opened to competition in June 2010, and NIE estimates that it loses 
about 3000 customers a month because of this. Competition existed before 2010 in the commercial and industrial 
markets. 
8 Detail on NI Electric‘s latest prices are available at http://www.nieenergy.co.uk/latestprices.php.  
9 An EasySaver card is a scheme that allows customers to flexibly pay their bill in installments. If, at the time of 
issuing a new bill, there is less than 10% balance on their card (or less than £10), they receive a discount. Under a 
budget account, the customer gets a discount by agreeing to make fixed regular payments. If they miss payments, 
they lose the discount. While the discounts are identical for these plans, the budget is a ―managed‖ plan with regular 
and fixed payment amounts, whereas an EasySaver  plan allows payment amounts and frequencies to vary.  9 
 
Throughout our study period, NIE offered a prepayment program to customers. 
Originally, a coin-operated device was used that had to be ―charged‖ with coin deposits in order 
to dispense electricity.  In 1993, NIE replaced coin-operated devices for new customers with 
electronic systems, introducing the powercard, which used a plastic debit-type card. In 2002, all 
prepayment customers were switched to a new program called Home Energy Direct (commonly 
dubbed ―keypad‖). The keypad system eliminated the equipment charge for prepayment, and the 
entire stock of older prepayment devices was replaced with the new technology. Concurrent to 
the switch to the keypad, customers on this plan started receiving a 2.5% discount (with no 
maximum limit) and the fixed fee was eliminated.
10 
The keypad meters combine a rechargeable card control with an interactive display that 
allows consumers to easily monitor their electric usage and cost.
11  The keypad meters can be 
considered sophisticated versions of the ―smart meters‖ propagating in the U.S. today: both types 
of devices automatically monitor electricity usage at very frequent intervals, often many times 
per hour. Keypads offer the additional functionality of a pay portal and a usage display. 
The keypad customer adds money to the keypad card (at a store kiosk or online, for 
example), then inserts the plastic card into the meter and enters their customer code to activate it. 
Using the keypad display, customers can check at any time how much credit they still have on 
the card, and a small credit (£1) is automatically granted when the credit on the card runs out.   
As of November 2010, households on the keypad accounted for 34% of the NIE 
residential customer base, direct debit monthly plans for 26%, direct debit quarterly for 4.7%, 
budget accounts for 0.2% and EasySavers for 6.3%. Customers on no particular plan (e.g., such 
                                                           
10 Variation in prices was introduced for customers on other plans at the same time. 
11 According to the NIE website (last accessed 2 January 2011), a pushbutton menu allows customers to (1) see the 
number of days of credit left, based upon the previous week‘s usage; (2) see how much electricity was used during 
the previous day, week, or month; (3) see the current electricity consumption, and thereby deduce the load of certain 
appliances. 10 
 
as those who receive quarterly bills and pay them in cash or by check) accounted for 27.7% of 
the NIE residential customer base.
12  
 
4. Theoretical Motivation 
We are interested in modeling the response to information that a typical prepayment 
customer will experience after the introduction of the keypad device. A customer with perfect 
information would always know his or her electricity consumption and the associated bill, based 
on the usage patterns of household members, the load of each electrical device and the weather 
realization at every point in time, combined with retail price. A consumer with perfect 
information and on a prepayment plan would likewise know the remaining balance on his 
prepayment card. Displaying usage information would therefore have no effect on such a 
consumer. 
What fully informed and rational consumers would do is one thing; what happens to real-
life consumers is another. We argue that inattention is unavoidable: For many consumers, the 
gains from monitoring usage are insufficient to justify much monitoring effort (Ito, 2010). 
Interpreting the feedback provided by the bill is complicated by the delay between consumption 
and billing, variability in weather, and other exogenous and non-recurrent events (blackouts, 
breakdown in equipment, visitors, absences from home, etc.). As a result, little monitoring 
occurs, and consumers imperfectly observe their electricity usage. Any ―surprise‖ in the amount 
of usage, therefore, must be due to inattention on the part of the consumer. Observed changes in 
consumption after an informational device is made available suggest that the device did provide 
―surprise‖ to inattentive consumers.  
                                                           
12 Personal communication from Gerry Forde, NIE, 15 December 2010.  11 
 
Easier to read, real-time information about usage may increase the productivity of 
monitoring, or may serve as a substitute for it. As we show below, economic theory does not 
provide unambiguous predictions as to whether information increases or decreases monitoring 
and electricity consumption.  
Consider a consumer whose utility depends on electricity E and consumption of a 
composite commodity X, subject to a budget constraint. Also assume without any loss of 
generality that some electricity is wasted (perhaps because the consumer fails to unplug 
appliances when not in use, improper use, etc.) and let  0 ) , (  I m H  be the portion of total 
electricity wasted by the household, which is a function of the amount of monitoring, m, and the 
amount of information that the consumer receives about his usage, I. This means that while the 
consumer derives utility from E, he is billed for  )) , ( I m H E E   . Function H( ) is decreasing in 
monitoring and information. We assume decreasing marginal utility from electricity. We also 
assume that the marginal returns to monitoring and information, are decreasing (i.e., the second 
derivatives of H( ) with respect to m and I, respectively, are negative), but make no assumptions 
on the cross-partial derivative of H with respect to monitoring and information. It is possible to 
envision situations where  I m H    /
2  is negative, implying that m and I are complements, as 
well as cases where  I m H    /
2  is positive, i.e., m and I are substitutes.  
The consumer chooses E, X, and m to maximize utility subject to his budget constraint:   
(1)    m p I m H E p X y m E        )) , ( 1 ( ,  
where  y  is income,   E p  is the price per kWh, and  m p  is the price per unit of monitoring. The 
first-order conditions with respect to m and I are  
(2)          0 , 1
*    I m H p U E E    and      12 
 
(3)      . 0 /
*        m E p m H E p        
Their interpretation is straightforward: People use electricity to the point E
*  where their 
marginal willingness to pay for the services of electricity is equal to the price at which they are 
billed ( H p p E E   ), and engage in monitoring m
* until the marginal saving in the utility bill is 
equal to the price per unit of monitoring. The demand for electricity and monitoring will depend 
on the prices of electricity and monitoring, income, and the shape of function H. 
Suppose there was an exogenous increase in I. What is the effect on the optimal 
monitoring and electricity consumption?  Optimal m
* may be raised or reduced, depending on 
the tradeoff between monitoring and information H(m,I), among other things. Even if the net 
effect is to reduce wastage H, electricity demand may increase or decrease. The comparative 
statics of the effect of information on electricity consumption, and monitoring are summarized in 
the Appendix. The competing effects of productivity gains in monitoring from information and 
an income effect that allows more consumption or monitoring make the direction of the effect 
indeterminate.
13  
Since economic theory does not offer unambiguous predictions as to the effect of a 
change in I on m
* and E
*, the effect of enhanced information on electricity use is an empirical 
question. As mentioned, we use data from Northern Ireland households before and after an 
exogenous change in feedback, supplemented with a group of customers who were presumably 
unaffected by this feedback, to assess this effect. In our empirical work, we focus on the effects 
on electricity use, since we do not observe monitoring.  
 
                                                           
13 The comparative statics are complicated by the presence of a non-linear budget constraint (monitoring, which can 
be purchased directly, provides utility indirectly through its effect on energy savings implicit consumption). 
Following the approach developed in Edlefson (1981), we developed a simplified expression for the comparative 
statics of interest, but they could not be definitively signed. See the Appendix for more detail.  13 
 
5. Empirical Approach 
A. The Experiment and the Treatment  
Suppose individuals in a population were assigned at random to a treatment and control 
group for the purpose of determining the effect of the treatment on an outcome variable. Also 
assume that observations were taken on the outcome variable for both control and treated 
subjects over multiple time periods, and that some of these periods were prior to the application 
of the treatment. Under these assumptions, the observed difference in mean outcome would be 
equal to the average treatment effect on the treated:  
(4)    ,  
where c is a dummy that takes on a value of one when the treatment is in place, and zero 
otherwise,   i y  is individual i‘s observed outcome, and y1 and y0 are the potential outcomes with 
and without the treatment (see  Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
  Suppose now that the assignment to the treatment and control groups is not random. Then 
the right-hand side of (4) contains an additional term, namely the selection bias, which is equal to 
.  Conventional approaches, such as the difference-in-difference 
estimator or OLS regressions, fail to control for selection bias, but it is possible to get around this 
problem by using propensity score matching, Heckman two-step methods, or other procedures to 
construct a term that soaks up the selection bias (Vella, 1998). 
  As mentioned, in this paper, we exploit the fact that in April 2002, NIE introduced a new 
metering device—the keypad—that allows customers to track consumption in real time, and a 
new pricing structure for its prepayment plan. New prepayment customers were placed directly 
on the keypad plan, and preexisting customers were moved en masse to the keypad, thus 
) 1 | ( ) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1       i i i i i i i c y y E c y E c y E
) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 0    i i i i c y E c y E14 
 
replacing the existing meters with the more advanced ones and applying the new pricing 
structure. At the same time, the pricing of other plans was changed.  
We interpret the introduction of the new metering device as the treatment of interest, 
customers on prepayment as the treatment group, and electricity consumption as the outcome of 
interest. Our control group is comprised of customers on all other plans. Since the price depends 
on the plan, customers select into their plan, and plan choice may be correlated with energy use 
patterns, there is potential for selection bias. We control for selection bias by using the Dubin-
McFadden selection correction approach, which is well suited to the situation in which people 
select into one of a finite number of possible states.  
 
B. Electricity Demand 
  We begin with estimating the regression equation: 
(5) 

lnEijt 0j 1ln pit 2lnINCijt xijtijt,  
where E is electricity usage (in kWh), p is the price per kWh, INC is household income, and x is 
a vector of variables thought to influence electricity consumption (weather, characteristics of the 
home and of the household, type of heating and appliances used, dummies for the month or year 
when the household was interviewed). Subscripts i, j and t denote the household, area where the 
household resides, and wave of the CHS surveys, respectively. Clearly, equation (5) is an 
electricity demand function, and   and   are the price and income elasticities, respectively, of 
electricity demand.  
  As previously explained, the price of electricity varies across plans, and households select 
their electricity plans. Unobservable household characteristics may influence both a household‘s 
choice of plan, and hence the price per kWh it faces, as well as this household‘s electricity 
1  2 15 
 
consumption. This makes price and consumption endogenous.  To remedy this problem, we 
implement a two-step estimation methodology based on Dubin and McFadden (1984).  
Specifically, we assume that households choose a plan to maximize utility. We posit that 
a household‘s indirect utility is a function of characteristics of the households and the home: 
(6)      

Vik Zik ik, 
where i denotes the household, k denotes the plan, Z is a vector of characteristics of the 
household and/or the home, and  is an i.i.d. extreme value error term with scale 1. The 
household chooses the alternative with the greatest utility, and so the probability of choosing 
plan k is: 










j i k i k
1
) exp( ) exp( ) Pr( ʱ Z ʱ Z  
with  1 ʱ normalized to zero for identification. 
We allow for possible correlation between  and , which makes electricity usage and the 
choice of plan endogenous. To obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients in equation (5), we 
must condition on the choice of plan. Dubin and McFadden assume that  
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sum to zero. Dubin and McFadden show that the coefficients in equation (5) can be estimated 
consistently by running OLS on  
(9)  ijt ik k
k m imt
imt imt
m it it it j ijt e P
P
P P










     

ˆ ln ˆ 1
ˆ ln ˆ
ln ln ln 2 1 0      γ x  16 
 
where k is the plan selected by household i, m denotes a plan, the   denote the predicted 
probabilities of selecting the various plans from the first-step multinomial logit of the observed 
plan choices, and the αs are the (rescaled by the standard deviation) correlation coefficients from 
(8). 
  Bourguignon et al. (2007) compare the performance of the Dubin-McFadden correction 
term in (9) with a simplified version that imposes the constraint that the α coefficients sum to 
zero, and with the selection correction procedures developed by Lee (1983) and Dahl (2002). 
They conclude that (9) is the most robust.  We report regression results based on (9), but for 
good measure repeat the same regressions with alternate selection correction procedures.   
  Since our sample is comprised of multi-year cross-sections drawn from the population of 
Northern Ireland, it is impossible to include household-specific effects, and we lack information 
to develop pseudo-panels based on detailed geography and housing type information (Deaton, 
1985).
14  We control for unobserved heterogeneity by including ward-specific intercepts (the   




C. The Effect of Usage Information on Usage 
                                                           
14 Other research (e.g., Bernard et al., 2010) has exploited multi-year cross-sections to construct pseudo panels based 
on the type of dwelling and geographical area where the household resides (which can be linked with a utility‘s 
service territory). Bernard et al. (2010) have multi-year cross-section data about electricity and gas consumption and 
prices in Quebec from 1989-2002, and their analysis is based on constructing pseudo-panels, i.e., relatively similar 
groups defined by area and house-size categories for which the relevant variables are the group averages. 
15 Northern Ireland is divided into twenty-six local governmental units called districts. Each district is a collection of 
wards. In Belfast county borough district, for example, there are 52 wards. There are currently 599 wards in 
Northern Ireland. Government officials are elected to represent several wards, and Census statistics are compiled at 
the ward level. For example, the 2001 Census outputs use the 582 electoral wards in existence at Census Day. All of 
these 582 wards had more than 100 residents/40 households. 
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  The question at the heart of this paper is whether providing feedback about consumption 
of electricity makes consumers change their usage levels. As we explained in section 3, in April 
2002 NIE replaced the powercard plan with the keypad plan, which offered discounted prices, 
dropped the annual meter charge, and substituted the old meter with a more advanced device that 
displayed real-time information. What is the (average) effect of such a change?  
To answer this question, we amend equation (5) to include dummies for the type of plan 
the household is on. Formally,  
(10)     
where D is a vector of dummies for the electricity scheme the household is on, and vector  
captures the effect that the type of plan has on electricity, above and beyond that of the price 
associated with that plan. We estimate equation (10) in two steps, using the selection correction 
approaches described in section 5.B, since the choice of plan is likely influenced by unobserved 
characteristics of the home or the household that also influence usage of electricity.   
The effect of feedback on consumption, at least for those households that are on 
prepayment plans, is thus  KEYPAD POWERCARD     . This is equivalent to a prepayment dummy × 
post 2002 dummy interaction term. For the ―perfectly informed consumer‖ of section 4, the 
effect would be zero. An effect different from zero suggests less-than-perfect information 
(inattention), which the meter helps correct.
16  
   
D. The Sample 
We pooled the data from 18 consecutive waves of the Continuous Household Survey of 
Northern Ireland, starting with the 1990-91 wave and ending with the 2008-09 wave. The 
                                                           
16 Since we do not know whether the customer actually checks the meter, this is an ―intention to treat‖ effect (see 
Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 163). 
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Continuous Household Survey (CHS) is an annual survey conducted by the Northern Ireland 
Research and Statistics Agency (NISRA). It is representative of the (civilian) population of 
Northern Ireland. The CHS elicits information about the dwelling (including type and size of the 
home, tenure, heating, and various living expenses, such as energy), health, education, 
employment and welfare payments.  
The surveys are conducted year-round, with approximately 300 households surveyed in 
each month, and cover different housing types, income levels, and geographic regions. Different 
households are interviewed in each wave of the survey, and so by pooling several waves we 
obtain a multi-year cross-section dataset, rather than a panel. A breakdown of the data by year is 
presented in table 3.  
Characteristics of the dwelling (including the type of structure, size and age, and 
ownership) come from the ―Tenure‖ section of the questionnaire, whereas information about 
heating and energy use comes from the ―Heating‖ module of the questionnaire. The respondent 
is asked whether the home has central heating, and what fuels are used for heating the home, 
distinguishing for summer and winter heating. He is also asked if each of these fuels is used for 
heating water and for cooking. The questionnaire also elicits the expenses associated with each 
of the fuels.  Next, the interviewer is instructed to ask the respondent to produce the most recent 
electricity bill, and to record the amount billed for the last quarter. Further questions inquire 
about how the respondent‘s household pays for electricity (plan and mode of payment), how 
much he paid most recently, and what period that payment covered.  
 
E. The Choice of Independent Variables  19 
 
Vector x in equations (5) and (10) is comprised of variables that we expect to influence to 
the demand of electricity directly (e.g., house size, etc.) or via the cost of monitoring.  It thus 
includes the home type (e.g., single-family, semi-detached, etc.), size (measured as the number 
of rooms) and the age of the home. It also includes the number of years the household has been 
living in this home, which we regard as a proxy for the household‘s familiarity with the energy 
efficiency of this dwelling and the vintage of heating and electrical equipment.  
Dummies for the type of heating system and characteristics of the household (its size, 
number of children, number of elderly persons, number of workers, education, and whether the 
household is comprised of unrelated adults) are also included. We note here that education and 
other household characteristics may also serve as proxies for the cost of monitoring electricity 
usage.  Finally, an important component of x is the weather. We include heating degree days and 
cooling degree days over the three months prior to the date when the household was interviewed.   
Vector Z (equation 6) includes some of the same variables, plus—for identification 
purposes—others that might influence the choice of plan but should have no direct influence on 
electricity consumption. This set of ―excluded variables‖ is comprised of whether the household 
owns a car, lives in the metro Belfast area, has income in the bottom 25% of the sample 
distribution, has one or more members with a disability that causes serious mobility impairment, 
since lack of transportation may make plans that require physically going out to pay bills less 
attractive. It is also likely that individuals may choose a plan over the other based on word of 
mouth or this plan‘s popularity with neighbors and friends. For this reason, we include in Z (but 
not in x) the percentage of the other residents of the same ward in the CHS that use: (i) a 
prepayment plan or (ii) a direct debit plan.   
 20 
 
6. The Data   
Attention is restricted to those households that presumably have a reasonable degree of 
control over the use of energy at their premises. For this reason, we excluded from the initial 
sample (N=55,065) i) squatters and households who live at a given location rent-free, ii) 
households for whom the dwelling serves as a business premises, and iii) observations where the 
respondent refused to provide information about tenure. We also excluded iv) persons or 
households that rented a single-room within a house or apartment, as that is likely to capture 
lodgers and other types of temporary housing arrangements where the respondent has little 
control over fuel use and bills. Items (i)-(iv) together account for around 1% of the original 
sample.  
Finally, we excluded observations where the most recent electricity bill is missing, those 
with missing information about the selected plan, as well as those for households with an electric 
storage heater, since these households would typically adopt the Economy7 tariff schedule, 
which makes it impossible for us to calculate the kWh used based on the CHS data.
17 For good 
measure, we further trim the bottom and top 1% of the distribution of electricity kWh in the 
sample. This left us with N=45,149 usable observations for our regressions. In subsequent 
regressions, we further exclude households that rented their dwelling from the Housing 
Executive (i.e., public or assisted housing, which account for 21.77% of the original sample) or 
from a housing association (a private charity that provides low-cost housing: 2.40% of the 
original sample), which results in a sample of 34,779 observations.  
Table 3, panel (B), shows the breakdown of the final two samples (with and without 
public assistance housing) by year. Table 4 displays descriptive statistics about the housing units 
                                                           
17 NIE however reports that only about 7% of the households subscribe to this tariff plan, which is effectively a 
time-of-use plan with nighttime prices much lower than daytime prices. 21 
 
in our samples, which are comprised primarily of single-family homes (38% and 44%), followed 
by semi-detached and terraced homes (21 and 33%, respectively). Approximately 32% of the 
households own the home outright, 38% are paying a mortgage, and the remaining 30% rent 
their homes.  
Information about heating is reported in table 5. Northern Ireland has a mild climate, with 
the temperature rarely higher than 75º Fahrenheit (24º Celsius), and thus little demand for air 
conditioning. As a consequence, much of the energy usage in the residential sector in Northern 
Ireland is for heating. Homes are heated with coal, fuel oil, natural gas, electricity, wood or peat, 
as well as other non-traditional fuels. In fact, a majority of homes in our sample use more than 
one fuel in their home. Tables 6 and 7 present statistics on household characteristics and income, 
respectively.  
Weather data are taken from several monitors in Northern Ireland available from the T3 
Global Surface Summary of the Day from NOAA.  Because the survey asks respondents about 
past energy consumption (typically quarterly), we use a three-month moving average of the 
heating degree days (HDD) and cooling degree days (CDD) relative to 65º F (18 ºC), as is 
standard practice with the US Department of Energy. The mean three-month average for HDD is 
490.65. 
Energy demand should, of course, be influenced by the presence of energy efficiency 
investments and appliances in the home. Unfortunately, the CHS does not routinely inquire about 
energy-efficiency investments. The only exception is the 2008-09 CHS (the last wave of surveys 
we use in this paper). Based on specific questions on energy efficiency, we know that by 2008-
09 about 83% of the homes covered by the CHS had attic insulation, 59% had cavity wall 
insulation, 76% had insulated the hot water tank, 56% had insulated the hot water pipes, 83% 22 
 
had double-paned windows, 36% had been weather-proofed, 58% had installed low-energy 
lightbulbs, and 15% had a programmable thermostat.
18 
In the same wave of the CHS, the questionnaire also elicited information as to whether 
the respondent had availed himself of incentives and subsidies for energy efficiency investments. 
Only about 3% had received incentives from the Warm Homes program, and a similar share had 
received other incentives for attic, wall and boiler insulation.
19 
All homes in the CHS are served by electricity. We identify tariff plan exactly in the CHS 
data and assign marginal electricity price based on the historical tariff data provided by NIE. 
Prices are all deflated to 2009 constant British Pounds using the Real Price Index.
20  We use the 
price information to calculate the kWh used in the last quarter by each household.
21  Descriptive 
statistics for electricity consumption and prices are displayed in table 8. The average household 
uses about 4200 kWh per year, a figure that is similar to the estimates provided by NIE (and 
much lower than consumption in the US). 
                                                           
18 See Clinch and Healy (2000) for a discussion of energy efficiency investments in homes in Ireland and policies 
that potentially encourage them. O‘Doherty et al. (2008) examine the relationship between ―potential energy use,‖ 
income, and home type and size in Ireland. 
19 The Warm Homes scheme was launched in 2001 by the Department of Social Development to address fuel 
poverty in Northern Ireland. The scheme provides insulation measures, heating measures and energy efficient 
lightbulbs to people on low incomes, targeting 8,250 households every year. Heatsmart is another program, started 
in April 1999 and managed by the Northern Ireland Energy Agency, which provides free and independent heating 
and energy saving advice to tenants across Northern Ireland. Winter fuel payments were introduced in 1997 to help 
low-income seniors with the costs of keeping warm during the winter (People aged between 60 and 79 years receive 
£250 per household, and those over age 80 receive £400). A separate cold winter payment of £25 each week, 
between November 1st and March 31st, is available when the temperature is freezing or below for any period of 
seven consecutive days. This extra payment is available to those low-income households receiving Pension Credit, 
Income Support, Income-based Jobseeker's Allowance or Income-related Employment and Support Allowance 
(ESA). It has been in existence since 1991. 
20 The real price index (RPI) is compiled by the UK government: 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Source.asp?vlnk=1442. 
21 We use the posted price per kWh. For most of the study period, this is the same as the marginal price per kWh. 
Explicit block pricing was applied for electricity only for a short period in the late 1990s, and was later replaced by 
a tariff schedule with a constant rate per kWh and no fixed fee, where marginal and average price are the same. 
Discounts were given to customers on different plans. The fact that such discounts in some cases were not to exceed 
a specified maximum effectively re-creates a form of (increasing) block pricing, but these apply only at extremely 
high levels of demand (around the 98
th percentile of the distribution of usage in our sample), and so we ignore this 
effect.  23 
 
  Information about the choice of payment plans for electricity is displayed in table 9. 
Combined with tables 1-2, this allows us to construct a complete picture of prices, plan features 
and percentage of the sample that selects each plan.  
 
7. Results  
A. Electricity Demand  
As explained in Section 5, we estimate the demand for electricity in two steps. The first 
step is a multinomial logit model, where the probability of choosing one of the seven possible 
payment plans listed in table 9 depends on household and dwelling characteristics. In the second 
step we estimate the demand for electricity (equation (5)) using the correction terms from the 
first-step MNL estimation. 
The results for several specifications of equation (5) are displayed in tables 10 and 11. All 
of them include geographic fixed effects, but omit the interview month and year dummies, which 
we found to be too strongly correlated with weather and prices. Regressions are reported for the 
full study period, as well as for 1999-2006 in an effort to narrow the window around the 
introduction of the keypad meter. All t statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the 
ward level.    
We first estimate equations where consumption depends on price, weather, income, 
dwelling and household characteristics (standard explanatory variables in a model of energy 
demand). The results of these regressions for the broader sample are reported in table 10, 
columns (A)-(D), and suggest that our data are plausible and consistent with a well-behaved 
electricity demand function. Starting with run (A), the price elasticity is -0.94 and the income 24 
 
elasticity is 0.17. We emphasize that this should be interpreted as the income elasticity 
conditional on knowing the income of the household.
22  
Both elasticities get smaller as we add explanatory variables: In specification (D), for 
example, the price elasticity is -0.74 and the income elasticity is 0.04.
23 We attribute this result to 
the presence of regressors that are correlated with income, such as the type of home and the 
education and ages of the household members (see Alberini et al., 2010).  
Turning to the other regressors, the weather does influence electricity usage: The three-
month moving average of HDD is positively and significantly associated with electricity usage in 
all specifications.
24  Housing characteristics are likewise associated with energy consumption, as 
expected. Consumption of electricity is positively and significantly associated with the number 
of rooms in the home (with each additional room increasing electricity usage by 5.6-7.5%). 
Semi-detached and terraced homes, which share one or more walls with a neighbor (and are 
therefore more insulated from cold weather), tend to use, all else the same, 9 to 18% less than 
single-family homes, depending on the specification.   
We control for the vintage of the home with period dummies.  All else the same, older 
homes (built before 1945) and homes built between 1945 and 1965 use roughly the same amount 
of electricity as homes built after 1985 (which is our omitted category). Homes built between 
1965 and 1985 use between 2.4% and 3.8% more. These results are intuitive: Newer homes are 
expected to be more energy efficient; older homes may have been retrofitted or perhaps contain 
                                                           
22 In the CHS, household income is top-coded, and so we include a dummy that keeps track of this. We also control 
for missing income in the model. The coefficients on the missing income and top-coded dummies are positive and 
significant, suggesting that households that do not report their income might be wealthy or otherwise have 
significantly larger electricity consumption than those that do.  Top earners consume 14% more than is explained by 
their imputed income alone.  
23 Our estimates of the income elasticity are consistent with Meier and Rehdanz (2010) for heating expenditure in 
the rest of the UK. 
24Because of the cool weather, Cooling-Degree Days (CDD) are effectively almost always zero for Northern Ireland, 
so they are excluded from our regressions. 25 
 
fewer appliances.  We also note that during the 1965-85 period there was a small construction 
boom in Northern Ireland, with homes being built quickly and inexpensively.
25 Finally, 
consumption depends in a quadratic fashion on the time the occupants have lived in their home. 
In specification (C), we add variables that describe the type of heating in the home.  Gas, 
electricity, oil, wood and coal (the heating fuel dummies entered in the model) are used by 98% 
of our sample. Many homes in Northern Ireland use more than one fuel type for heating (e.g., 
central oil heating with supplemental electric heating). Despite limitations in the data,
26 the 
coefficients on heat type are highly significant and intuitively appealing: Homes with electric 
heating use more electricity (about 13-16% more), all else the same, and homes heated with gas, 
oil, wood or coal about 7-9% less than the baseline category (all other fuel types).  
Specification (D) adds household variables to the model: the number of household 
members in (broad) age groups, the education level, the number of workers, and whether the 
home is rented.  Most of these variables are significant. The number of children and adults is 
positively correlated with energy usage, but the coefficient on the number of elderly persons is 
negative. In other words, adding an adult increases usage, but at a lower rate if this adult is an 
elderly person. We suspect that the elderly might engage in more energy conservation and use 
fewer appliances than younger individuals.  
Households with greater education levels and more employed persons are associated with 
less electricity usage. The presence of a college-educated adult implies 4.5% less usage. An 
additional worker implies a 2% drop in electricity consumption. We interpret these results to 
represent the likelihood of households to take steps to improve energy efficiency, and also to 
                                                           
25 George Hutchinson, personal communication, 14 December, 2010. 
26 The CHS questionnaire elicits information about up to 10 different types of fuel for heating purposes, but does not 
allow us to recognize which is the primary type of fuel. For this reason, our heating variables are not mutually 
exclusive: They merely denote the presence or absence of a certain heating type in the home. 26 
 
proxy the amount of time spent in the home.  Renters use less electricity than owners, most likely 
because they have smaller homes and fewer electricity-using devices.  
 
B. What is the Effect of the Feedback? 
In specification (E) in table 10, we include dummy variables for the different electricity 
plans to see if they have an effect on consumption that goes beyond the price per kWh that they 
carry. The omitted plan is the traditional ―account‖ plan, the standard offer service for NIE, 
whereby customers are billed quarterly and pay by cash, check or through their EasySaver. We 
hypothesize that the keypad system better enables individuals to monitor their usage, which may 
encourage conservation steps and energy efficiency, and hence lowers usage.  
Who are our keypad customers? In our sample, keypad customers have homes with fewer 
rooms and are more likely to be in a terraced home than a detached home. They also have 
slightly lower household income and are more likely to be renters than those in other plans. 
Keypad homes are also slightly less likely to use electric heat. Our regressions, however, already 
control for these characteristics, as well as selection into the plan. 
As shown in (E) in table 10, households on the keypad do use 13% less electricity than 
the baseline group, even accounting for house type and size, heating type, income and household 
characteristics. The net effect of the keypad treatment, above and beyond the price discount it 
offers, is computed as the coefficient on powercard minus the coefficient on the keypad dummy.  
Based on (E), this effect is thus a reduction by almost 20%. The exact point estimate is -0.195 
(standard error 0.0171). 27 
 
In column (F), the sample is restricted to 1997 and later, since 1997 is the first year when 
variation was introduced in the price of electricity.
27 There is virtually no difference between 
usage levels between powercard users and standard ―account‖ holders, once we control for price, 
income and dwelling and household characteristics. Moreover, the coefficient on the keypad 
dummy is -0.14 and is virtually the same as its counterpart in col. (E), resulting in a net average 
reduction of -0.108 (standard error 0.0168) in usage of electricity among prepayment 
households. Further restricting the sample to 1999-2006 gives very similar results: The 
coefficient on the keypad is -0.12, the  powercard per se has no effect beyond that of price, 
income, house and household characteristics, and the net effect of keypad is a -0.092 reduction 
(standard error 0.0153) in electricity usage.  
For good measure, we also re-run models (E)-(G) with the Lee and Dahl selection 
correction terms instead of the unrestricted Dubin-McFadden approach. The Lee approach results 
in negative and significant estimates (keypad -0.066, powercard 0.10, difference -0.166), 
whereas the Dahl approach produces slightly more modest effects (-0.14 keypad, powercard 
0.036, difference -0.104) of the impact of the introduction of the keypad.  
 
D. Other Robustness Checks  
The sample used for the regressions of table 10 includes households who live in publicly-
assisted housing. Since these households tend to be poorer, we wondered whether they had a 
different price and income elasticity, and a different response to the change in the meter and 
price schedule associated with the introduction of the keypad. In table 11 we report the same 
regressions as in table 10, but based on a sample that omits public/assisted housing. The 
                                                           
27Although assessed with a fixed charge for their meter, prepayment customers received the same price as standard 
offer service customers until 2002. 28 
 
coefficients are similar to their counterparts in table 10, and the ―average treatment effect‖ of the 
introduction of the keypad is -0.205 (standard error 0.0199). 
We remind the reader that in our regression the price of electricity is the marginal price 
per kWh. This is certainly appropriate after 1999, when NIE dropped the standing charge (fixed 
monthly fee) and adopted a constant price per kWh.
28 Even after 2002, prices may vary across 
plans, but the price per kWh is constant, regardless of quantity, for any given plan. All results are 
virtually unchanged when the analysis is restricted to 1997 and later years. Omitting the 
geographic fixed effects results in a change of the key coefficients, namely the price and income 
elasticity, by at most 5%.  
To make sure that we do not incorrectly attribute to the keypad a general decrease in 
electricity consumption in Northern Ireland over time, we checked the average household usage 
level, and found that, if anything, it increases over time. We also reran equation (10) excluding 
the price of electricity, but including year dummies. The results indicate that, all else the same, 
on average electricity consumption increases over time. For example, the coefficients on the 
years 1991 (the first year of the sample), 1995, 2000, and 2005 dummies are -0.083, -0.053, 
0.067, and 0.068 respectively. This reinforces our result that the reduction in usage given house 
size, income, etc. after the introduction of the keypad is specific to a group—the prepayment 
group—and does not extend to the rest of the customer base. 
 
8. Policy Implications   
                                                           
28 To handle the period in which NIE applied block pricing, we did attempt to instrument for the marginal price 
using the same approach Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989), but the results were unstable and disappointing. This is 
because i) block pricing applies for a short period of time in the middle of our study period, ii) is subsequently 
replaced by constant price per kWh and no fixed charge, which makes marginal and average price the same for a 
substantial portion of our study period, and iii) even when the discount caps apply, which in theory creates 
increasing block pricing, they become binding as levels of consumption so high that hardly anyone is bound by 
them. 29 
 
We wish to examine whether the keypad program delivers cost-effective CO2 emissions 
reductions (because of the reduction in electricity consumption) compared with those of more 
traditional abatement measures. At this time, credits for Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) 
can be bought and sold on the European exchange at about £11 per tonne CO2e,
29 but the UK 
government relies on a policy price of carbon of £25  per tonne CO2e in 2009 (DECC, 2009).
30  
Turning to the keypad program, the utility must face the cost of acquiring and installing 
the new meters. We estimate the cost of keypad meters to be the purchase price and installation 
costs per meter. Owen and Ward (2007) estimate these costs to be an additional £37-43 and £25-
30 per meter, respectively.
31 Operating costs are assumed not to change, bringing the total per-
unit costs for the life of keypad devices (assumed to be 10 years) to £62-73.  
Each kWh of grid electricity in the UK is estimated to generate 0.544 kgCO2e (DEFRA, 
2009). If we take this figure at face value, a reduction of 19% of average prepayment usage 
(4016 kWh per year), over a span of 10 years, equates to 4151 kg CO2e (415.09 per year
32) for 
the mean keypad consumer. This implies a carbon reduction cost of £14.93 – £17.34 per tonne 
CO2e.   
In sum, a regulator seeking to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from residential 
electricity consumption can choose between mandating a keypad program, or paying for the 
abatement elsewhere (the marginal abatement cost is equivalent to the price of CER on the 
European exchange). Assuming that the response is the same as the one we estimate in this 
paper, our calculations suggest that a keypad program is similar in cost to buying CER credits.  
                                                           
29 Based on June 2011 market price for CO2e CER contract (€12.86, which is equal to £11.29 at prevailing 
exchange rates), accessed April 1, 2011.  CER contract prices in 2010 fluctuated between €12 and €14, [REF] 
30 The ―traded‖ price of carbon is used for appraising policies that affect emissions in sectors covered by the EU 
ETS (i.e. the power sector). It is based upon estimates of future EUA and global carbon market prices. 
31 Owen and Ward (2007) base their estimates on 300,000 installed units, which is slightly more than the 250,000 
installed units in NIE, but indicate that unit costs have been falling over time. On balance we find their estimates 
reasonable.  
32 Based on the average powercard usage of 4016 kWh usage per year. 30 
 
This cost-effectiveness evaluation assumes no change in producer welfare as a result of the 
program, with the exception of the purchase and installation costs of the meters. 
On the utility side, lost revenue from energy savings is partially offset by avoided costs. 
NIE does not generate any electricity; rather, it purchases power from the Single Electricity 
Market for Ireland and Northern Ireland.
33 NIE Energy is limited to receive a profit margin of 
1.8%.
34 There are no pressing demographic changes or capacity limitations in the transmission 
and distribution network, thus there is no operational reason to seek to reduce electricity 
consumption. Assuming no change in the cost structure and further assuming that the entire 
keypad customer base uses 19% less electricity than it would on another prepayment plan, the 
utility would experience a reduction in profit equal to the 19% demand reduction multiplied by 
the profit margin attributable to the prepayment customers.  
In practice, the keypad is likely to result in substantial cost reductions for NIE, suggesting 
little or no loss of profit.
35 NIE initially planned to install 75,000 keypad meters, but now has 
over 250,000, evidence of some derived benefit to the utility. Utility representatives cite lower 
service costs for customers (no billing or collection costs, lower customer support costs) as 
benefits of the keypad program (Livingstone, 2011). 
There may be a number of social benefits from a keypad-type program, which we do not 
attempt to quantify in this paper. For example, it may help meet politically important fuel 
poverty policy goals by providing discounted electricity to a historically low-income prepayment 
customer class (Livingstone, 2011). Other social benefits include reductions of other air pollutant 
                                                           
33 http://www.nie.co.uk/suppliers/faqs.htm#u1 accessed March 22, 2011 
34 Taken from ―Fuel Poverty Interventions, A Utility Perspective‖ Presentation given at the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) Fuel Poverty Workshop, Dublin, Ireland January 28-29: 
www.iea.org/work/2011/poverty/pres8_LIVINGSTONE.pdf Accessed on March 22, 2011. 
35 At least in the US, utilities seeking to install smart meters estimate the reductions in costs due to the smart meters 
to be large. See, for example, http://tinyurl.com/SMECOAMI.  31 
 
byproducts of power generation (which may be experienced at other locations in the UK), 
benefits from foregone imports of fossil fuel, and the security and macroeconomic cost savings 
that these imply. Private benefits include energy savings to consumers, and operational cost 
savings to companies. 
 
9. Conclusions  
We have used a large-scale natural experiment (the introduction of the keypad device in 
2002) which affected all prepayment customers, and unique data on residential electricity 
consumption over 18 years in a setting with extensive payment plan variation (Northern Ireland), 
to identify the effect of usage information on electricity consumption. We have focused 
exclusively on customers who pay their own bills, corrected for selection into the plan, and 
accounted for unobserved heterogeneity using geographic fixed effects.  
For prepayment customers, the results support our hypothesis that households respond to 
the provision of information by using less electricity, even accounting for their homes, heat, and 
household characteristics. This effect is quite pronounced (15-20%), providing support for earlier 
claims in the literature for smart metering and feedback displays (e.g. Darby 2006), which were 
however based on small and short-lived pilot programs.  These results are derived from well-
behaved demand regression equations which exhibit reasonable and intuitive estimates of 
important explanatory variables, such as income, house size, type of heating system, and number 
of occupants. 
To our knowledge this is the first attempt to estimate the effect of information using both 
a large-scale experiment and a large sample. The fact that these effects were experienced by 
prepayment customers, a group to whom electricity usage is already salient, underscores the 32 
 
potential of information-induced energy efficiency. As of November 2010 NIE reports keypad 
enrollment of over 34% of the entire residential customer base (N=710,000). If our estimates on 
electricity reduction extend to the majority of these customers, the keypad scheme is responsible 
for a significant shift in demand, and similar schemes may offer a promising avenue for 
greenhouse gas reduction. We estimate the program to be comparable in cost to other methods of 
CO2 abatement, even excluding the ancillary benefits on service costs and energy efficiency.  
It is difficult to extrapolate to what would happen if the entire customer base was 
switched to a keypad-like meter. Likewise, we do not know how customers on the keypad were 
able to reduce consumption: Were they simply more careful? Did they engage in conservation, or 
did they undertake renovations and energy efficiency investments? We leave answering these 
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Appendix: Comparative Statics: 
A consumer maximizes utility over energy consumption E and monitoring of energy 
consumption m (which reduces energy ‘waste‘ A), as well as consumption of a composite 
commodity X. Information I is a parameter which also affects monitoring. The goal is to identify 
the effect of information on energy usage, dE
*/dI using comparative statics. 
The Lagrangian for the consumer‘s maximization problem is: 
(A.1)         (   )    [                 (     [   ])]  
Energy is priced at pE per kWh, monitoring is priced at pm per unit, and the price of 
nonenergy consumption is normalized to one. The FOCs are: 
(A.2)                 (     ) = 0 
(A.3)                = 0 
(A.4)          [           ] = 0 
(A.5)                          (     ) = 0 




*, we use the implicit 
function theorem to develop expressions for the comparative statics of interest (Chiang 1984).  
      
   ⁄  
|  |
| | where J is the Jacobian matrix, and JI is the matrix formed of the Jacobian 
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If we recognize that the term               is identical to the first order condition 
(A.4) and is thus equal to zero, the expression simplify to:  
| |      [           (            )]       [           (           )] 
   (     )[   (  (     )           )] 
| |          [         (  (     )) ]   (     )  
And 
|  |         [           (            )]       [           (            )] 
   (     )[   (                )] 
|  |       
   [                             (     )] 
We make the following assumptions: 
a)  HI , Hm < 0 Hmm > 0 
b)  UXX,  UEE  < 0 
c)  pm, pE, E, H,    > 0 
Plugging in the signed assumptions, | |remains indeterminate, and the sign of |  | depends on the 
sign of HmI. A simplified approach following Edlefsen (1981) achieves the same result. 
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quarter  Unrestricted price (pence per kWh) 
Max. discount 





per year for 
Monthly Direct 
Debit Plan  
Apr-90  £11.80  6.84       
Apr-91  £13.09  7.41       
Apr-92  £13.61  7.71       
Apr-93  £14.15  7.87       
Apr-94  £13.95  7.75       
Apr-95  £14.84  8.25       
Apr-96  £15.20  8.45       
Apr-97  £7.94  9.16 first 250 kWh/8.16 thereafter       
Apr-98  £7.94  9.16 first 250 kWh/8.16 thereafter       
Apr-99     9.00       
Apr-00     8.60       
Apr-01     9.38       
Apr-02     9.38  £5.0  £10.0 
Apr-03     9.38  £14.0  £28.0 
Apr-04     9.64  £14.0  £28.0 
Apr-05     9.95  £14.0  £28.0 
Apr-06     11.02  £14.0  £28.0 
Apr-07     10.69  £14.0  £28.0 
Nov-07     11.11  £22.0  £34.0 
Jul-08     12.66  £22.0  £34.0 
Oct-08     16.88  £26.0  £40.0 
Jan-09     15.06  £26.0  £40.0 
Oct-09     14.31  £26.0  £40.0 
Oct-10     14.31  £26.0  £40.0 
         
Notes:         
Prices exclude VAT. Domestic VAT of 8% was introduced in 1994 and was changed to 5% in 1997  
where it has remained until now. 
   
Discounts are 4% for monthly direct debit, and 2.5% for quarterly direct debit, up to the maximum total 
shown in the table.  
     








paper  name   since  discount 
max discount 
per year (£) 
frequency of 
payment 




Saver  April 1997  1.50%  10  unspecified  
if balance in the account 
is no more than £10 or 
10% of the total bill 
BUDGE  Budget 
1970s, 
discounts 





if balance in the account 
is no more than £10 or 









see table 1. 
even monthly 









see table 1 
even quarterly 
payments     





Table 3. Composition of the sample by year. 
  
(A) Full CHS, all 
years 






year  N  percent  N  Percent  N  Percent 
1991  3,166  5.75  2,862  6.34  1,976  5.68 
1992  3,107  5.64  2,799  6.2  1,885  5.42 
1993  3,097  5.62  2,557  5.66  1,755  5.05 
1994  3,182  5.78  2,760  6.11  1,927  5.54 
1995  3,220  5.85  2,823  6.25  1,990  5.72 
1996  3,221  5.85  2,752  6.09  2,023  5.82 
1997  2,892  5.25  2,467  5.46  1,808  5.2 
1998  3,024  5.49  2,554  5.66  1,944  5.59 
1999  2,809  5.1  2,364  5.24  1,790  5.15 
2000  3,039  5.52  2,579  5.71  1,972  5.67 
2001  2,800  5.08  2,350  5.2  1,821  5.24 
2002  2,806  5.1  2,342  5.19  1,901  5.47 
2003  2,787  5.06  2,242  4.97  1,836  5.28 
2004  2,769  5.03  2,091  4.63  1,798  5.17 
2005  2,773  5.04  2,059  4.56  1,769  5.09 
2006  2,603  4.73  1,967  4.36  1,713  4.93 
2007  2,726  4.95  1,904  4.22  1,652  4.75 
2008  2,567  4.66  1,914  4.24  1,699  4.89 
2009  2,476  4.5  1,766  3.91  1,520  4.37 
                    
Total  55,064  100  45,152  100  34,779  100 
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Table 4. Characteristics of the Home: Descriptive Statistics 
     
(A) Full Sample 
(B) Excluding Housing 
Executive 
Variable  Description 
Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
SFhome  Single-family (detached) 
home dummy 




45152  0.215  0.411  34779  0.243  0.429 
terracehome  terraced home dummy  45152  0.330  0.470  34779  0.234  0.424 
totroom  total number of rooms   45151  6.793  1.865  34778  7.154  1.900 
h_1945  built before 1945 dummy  45152  0.139  0.346  34779  0.167  0.373 
h_1945_65  built 1945-65 dummy  45152  0.156  0.363  34779  0.153  0.360 
h_1965_85  built 1965-85 dummy  45152  0.315  0.465  34779  0.279  0.449 
 
Table 5. Heating: Descriptive Statistics 
     
(A) Full Sample 
(B) Excluding Housing 
Executive 
Variable  Description  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
gasheat  gas heat dummy   45152  0.096  0.295  34779  0.104  0.306 
oilheat 
heating oil heat 
dummy 
45152  0.504  0.500  34779  0.618  0.486 
woodheat  wood heat dummy  45152  0.198  0.398  34779  0.188  0.391 
coalheat  coal heat dummy  45152  0.440  0.496  34779  0.390  0.488 











Table 6. Household Characteristics: Descriptive Statistics 
     
(A) Full Sample 
(B) Excluding Housing 
Executive 
Variable  Description  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 




Number of adults in 
household 
45152  2.022  0.959  34779  2.130  0.956 
ndepkids 
number of children 18 or 
younger … 
45143  0.770  1.187  34772  0.773  1.169 
renter 
household rents the home 
(dummy)…………….. 
45152  0.053  0.224  34779  0.069  0.253 
nelderly 
number of household 
members 65 and older…. 
45151  0.350  0.622  34778  0.337  0.627 
nworkers 
number of household 
members who work……… 
44956  0.193  0.600  34610  0.216  0.636 
college 
household member has 
attended college 
(dummy)… 
45152  0.110  0.314  34779  0.136  0.343 
students 
unrelated adults, probably 
students… 
45152  0.047  0.213  34779  0.059  0.235 
 
Table 7. Household Income: Descriptive Statistics 
     
(A) Full Sample 
(B) Excluding Housing 
Executive 
Variable  Description  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
inc_r 
annual household 
income ( 2009 £) 
39061  20448  13482.2  29665  23663.10  13555.63 
recodedlinc_r  recoded ln inc_r  45152  8.375  3.378  34779  8.420  3.553 
incomemissing  missing dummy  45152  0.135  0.342  34779  0.147  0.354 








Table 8. Electricity Demand and Price 
     
(A) Full Sample 
(B) Excluding Housing 
Executive 
Variable  Description 
Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 





(kwh per quarter) 
45152  996.45  544.61  34779  1045.59  549.12 
electprice_r 
marginal price (£ 
per kWh, 2009 £) 
45152  0.115  0.01  34779  0.115  0.008 
lkwh  ln kWh  45152  6.754  0.57  34779  6.814  0.547 
lmargprice_r  ln electprice  45152  -2.166  0.06  34779  -2.166  0.067 
 
 
Table 9. Choice of Electricity Plan: Frequencies. 
        







Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent 
1 
Account (incl. 
EasySaver & Cash) 
Mostly unrestricted 
tariff   33,518  74.23  26,645  76.61 
2  DDM  See tables 1 and 2   4,012  8.89  3,803  10.93 
3  DDQ  See tables 1 and 2  304  0.67  269  0.77 
4  Budget Account  See tables 1 and 2  1,986  4.4  1,567  4.51 
5  DHSS  Unrestricted tariff  492  1.09  195  0.56 
6  Powercard  Unrestricted tariff  3,158  6.99  1,229  3.53 
7  Keypad  See tables 1 and 2  1,682  3.73  1,071  3.08 
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Table 10. Electricity Demand: Effect of Price, Income, House and Household Characteristics. 
Dep. Var.: ln kWh per quarter.  






(G) 1999 - 
2006 
Constant  1.90***  1.99***  1.95***  2.81***  2.81***  3.64***  4.65*** 
ln price (2009 GBP)  -0.94***  -0.71***  -0.69***  -0.74***  -0.72***  -0.66***  -0.54*** 
recodedlinc_r  0.17***  0.13***  0.14***  0.042***  0.045***  0.032***  0.018* 
lHDD  0.020***  0.032***  0.037***  0.029***  0.029***  0.056***  0.048*** 
SFhome     0.0083  0.086***  0.041*  0.040*  0.050*  -0.0077 
SDhome     -0.17***  -0.092***  -0.12***  -0.11***  -0.091***  -0.12*** 
terracehome     -0.18***  -0.085***  -0.14***  -0.14***  -0.12***  -0.12*** 
total number of rooms     0.073***  0.076***  0.056***  0.055***  0.046***  0.050*** 
built before 1945     -0.013  -0.0041  0.0050  0.0044  0.00074  0.0046 
between 1945 and 1965     0.013  0.013  0.014  0.013  -0.0010  0.0018 
between 1965 and 1985     0.038***  0.036***  0.024***  0.024***  0.028***  0.032*** 
duration     0.0021***  0.0017***  0.0032***  0.0032***  0.0037***  0.0030*** 
duration
2     -3.4E-5***  -3.1E-5***  -3.8E-5***  -3.8E-5***  -3.9E-5***  -3.4E-5*** 
Gasheat        -0.093***  -0.069***  -0.062***  -0.080***  -0.072*** 
Oilheat        -0.070***  -0.046***  -0.040***  -0.067***  -0.098*** 
Woodheat        -0.068***  -0.075***  -0.075***  -0.056***  -0.050*** 
Coalheat        -0.079***  -0.096***  -0.098***  -0.067***  -0.078*** 
Electheat        0.13***  0.16***  0.16***  0.13***  0.11*** 
number of adults           0.15***  0.15***  0.15***  0.15*** 
 ndepkids           0.083***  0.082***  0.082***  0.082*** 
Renter           -0.029*  -0.020  -0.019  -0.0069 
 nelderly           -0.044***  -0.044***  -0.043***  -0.045*** 
 nworkers           -0.020***  -0.020***  -0.0039  -0.0049 
College Educated           -0.045***  -0.043***  -0.044**  -0.080*** 
Students           0.025  0.019  0.014  0.011 
DDM              -0.049***  -0.068***  -0.057*** 
DDQ              -0.049  -0.048  -0.11 
Budge              0.054*  0.032  0.0091 
Powercard              0.065**  0.032  0.028 
Keypad              -0.13***  -0.14***  -0.12*** 
DHSS              0.059  -0.064  -0.14* 
ward effects  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
dummies for missing 
income, topcoded 
Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
R-squared  0.14  0.19  0.21  0.30  0.30  0.29  0.30 
N.of cases  45149  45121  45121  44917  44917  28444  17918 
*p<0.5   **p<0.1  ***p<0.00145 
 
Table 11. Electricity Demand excluding Housing Executive renters          
Dep. Var.: ln kWh per quarter 






(G) 1999 - 
2006 
Constant  2.08***  2.31***  2.32***  2.85***  2.83***  3.74***  4.22*** 
ln price (2009 GBP)  -0.90***  -0.67***  -0.66***  -0.70***  -0.67***  -0.64***  -0.50*** 
recodedlinc_r  0.17***  0.12***  0.13***  0.030***  0.033***  0.024**  0.012 
lHDD  0.029***  0.039***  0.041***  0.036***  0.037***  0.054***  0.045*** 
SFhome     0.072*  0.11***  -0.0011  0.00055  0.056  0.0063 
SDhome     -0.12***  -0.087***  -0.14***  -0.14***  -0.073*  -0.11** 
terracehome     -0.20***  -0.17***  -0.20***  -0.20***  -0.14***  -0.16*** 
total number of rooms     0.071***  0.072***  0.054***  0.053***  0.046***  0.049*** 
built before 1945     -0.0092  -0.0052  -0.0067  -0.0077  -0.0035  -0.0053 
between 1945 and 1965     0.016  0.013  0.012  0.012  0.00072  -0.0017 
between 1965 and 1985     0.038***  0.036***  0.024***  0.024***  0.033***  0.035*** 
duration     0.0035***  0.0031***  0.0040***  0.0039***  0.0045***  0.0039*** 
duration
2     -4.7E-5***  -4.4E-5***  -4.7E-5***  -4.6E-5***  -4.7E-5***  -4.2E-5*** 
Gasheat        -0.070***  -0.049***  -0.045***  -0.055***  -0.049*** 
Oilheat        -0.031***  -0.018*  -0.014*  -0.039***  -0.057*** 
Woodheat        -0.038***  -0.048***  -0.049***  -0.034**  -0.029* 
Coalheat        -0.038***  -0.049***  -0.050***  -0.033***  -0.041*** 
Electheat        0.092***  0.12***  0.12***  0.092***  0.081*** 
number of adults           0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16*** 
 Ndepkids           0.082***  0.081***  0.081***  0.082*** 
Renter           -0.034**  -0.024  -0.013  -0.0085 
 Nelderly           -0.032***  -0.032***  -0.038***  -0.044*** 
 Nworkers           -0.021***  -0.021***  -0.0074  -0.0093 
College Educated           -0.021*  -0.021*  -0.021  -0.071*** 
Students           0.0028  -0.00026  -0.0011  0.0086 
DDM              -0.11***  -0.11***  -0.065** 
DDQ              -0.17**  -0.13  -0.065 
Budge              -0.049  -0.046  -0.010 
Powercard              -0.035  -0.035  0.017 
Keypad              -0.24***  -0.22***  -0.11** 
DHSS              -0.30***  -0.29***  -0.26** 
ward effects  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
dummies for missing 
income, topcoded 
Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
R-squared  0.13  0.19  0.19  0.29  0.30  0.30  0.31 
N.of cases  34777  34759  34759  34584  34584  23082  14531 
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